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and Auditory Verbal Hallucinations: 
What Are the Relations?
Charles Fernyhough1*, Ashley Watson1, Marco Bernini2, Peter Moseley1,3 and 
Ben Alderson-Day1
1Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom, 2Department of English Studies, Durham 
University, Durham, United Kingdom, 3School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, United Kingdom
Interacting with imaginary companions (ICs) is now considered a natural part of childhood 
for many children, and has been associated with a range of positive developmental 
outcomes. Recent research has explored how the phenomenon of ICs in childhood and 
adulthood relates to the more unusual experience of hearing voices (or auditory verbal 
hallucinations, AVH). Specifically, parallels have been drawn between the varied 
phenomenology of the two kinds of experience, including the issues of quasi-perceptual 
vividness and autonomy/control. One line of research has explored how ICs might arise 
through the internalization of linguistically mediated social exchanges to form dialogic 
inner speech. We present data from two studies on the relation between ICs in childhood 
and adulthood and the experience of inner speech. In the first, a large community sample 
of adults (N = 1,472) completed online the new Varieties of Inner Speech – Revised 
(VISQ-R) questionnaire (Alderson-Day et al., 2018) on the phenomenology of inner speech, 
in addition to providing data on ICs and AVH. The results showed differences in inner 
speech phenomenology in individuals with a history of ICs, with higher scores on the 
Dialogic, Evaluative, and Other Voices subscales of the VISQ-R. In the second study, a 
smaller community sample of adults (N = 48) completed an auditory signal detection task 
as well as providing data on ICs and AVH. In addition to scoring higher on AVH proneness, 
individuals with a history of ICs showed reduced sensitivity to detecting speech in white 
noise as well as a bias toward detecting it. The latter finding mirrored a pattern previously 
found in both clinical and nonclinical individuals with AVH. These findings are consistent 
with the view that ICs represent a hallucination-like experience in childhood and adulthood 
which shows meaningful developmental relations with the experience of inner speech.
Keywords: hallucination proneness, signal detection, theory of mind, social cognition, imagination, development
INTRODUCTION
Between a third and two-thirds of young school-age children will engage with imaginary 
companions (ICs), defined as invisible characters with whom children converse and interact 
(Taylor et  al., 2004). These characters can include invisible characters which nevertheless have 
an air of reality for the child (Svendsen, 1934), and personified objects (imaginary beings that 
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are embodied in a toy or object). Since research in this area 
adopted new methodological standards in the 1990s, ICs have 
been associated with a range of positive developmental outcomes 
(Taylor, 1999). Several studies have linked engagement with 
an IC to superior social cognition (Taylor and Carlson, 1997; 
Roby and Kidd, 2008; Davis et  al., 2011), while other studies 
have indicated that children with an IC are more creative 
(Schaefer, 1969; Seiffge-Krenke, 1997; Hoff, 2005), more sociable 
(Mauro, 1991), and capable of constructing more complex 
narratives (Trionfi and Reese, 2009).
Historically, however, engaging with ICs has been considered 
a cause for concern, and even a possible marker of future 
mental illness. Although this view has now been discredited 
(Taylor, 1999), several features of engaging with ICs raise 
parallels with an experience that is often considered pathological: 
the experience of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) or 
“hearing voices.” Hallucinations are defined as percept-like 
experiences which occur in the absence of an appropriate 
stimulus, which have the full force or impact of the corresponding 
veridical perception, and which are not under the experiencer’s 
direct or voluntary control (Slade and Bentall, 1988). Several 
researchers have considered whether the experience of engaging 
with ICs bears commonalities with that of AVH. Intuitively, 
a point of commonality should reside in the fact that both 
ICs and AVH generate disembodied yet percept-like social 
agents with whom to interact. Unlike ICs, however, AVH are 
not usually experienced as willfully created by the subject, but 
rather as spontaneously occurring emergences of quasi-perceptual 
agents (Nayani and David, 1996; Woods et  al., 2015). ICs 
might also be  assumed to show cooperative and positive 
interactional social behavior compared to AVH, which often 
have a negative emotional valence. In addition, AVH can 
be  perceived as located either internally or externally in space, 
whereas ICs usually tend to be  projected as agents in the 
external world. In short, there seem to be  good reasons for 
testing productive comparisons between AVH and ICs, and 
research and theoretical insights on the latter might inform 
and challenge theoretical and empirical work on the former.
One line of research has examined engagement with ICs 
as involving non-veridical percept-like experiences. Pearson 
et  al. (2001) found that children’s reporting of ICs in middle 
childhood related to their tendency to report hearing words 
in an ambiguous auditory stimulus. Using a more rigorous 
methodology, Fernyhough et  al. (2007) replicated this effect 
in two samples, linking the childhood experience of ICs to a 
Vygotskian view of development by which thinking develops 
through the gradual internalization of linguistically mediated 
social exchanges to form inner speech (see Alderson-Day and 
Fernyhough, 2015, for a review). This interpretation was 
subsequently supported by Davis et  al.’s (2013) finding that 
children with ICs were more advanced (relative to their peers 
without ICs) on the internalization of private speech, considered 
by Vygotsky to be  a precursor of inner speech.
Another line of research has considered the extent to which 
ICs are under the experiencer’s voluntary control. There is 
growing recognition that the behavior of ICs is not always 
under children’s control, providing a further rationale for 
considering at least some manifestations of ICs as hallucination-
like phenomena. Hoff (2005) and Taylor et  al. (2007) have 
presented findings suggesting considerable variability in the 
extent to which children report that their ICs can have alternative 
thoughts, feelings, or/and behaviors to their own. Taylor and 
colleagues have referred to this as the “illusion of independent 
agency.” In this article, we use the equivalent term IC autonomy 
to refer to IC behaviors that are not compliant with the host’s 
own cognitions, emotions, and intentions.
A further way in which research into ICs has developed 
in recent years concerns a growing recognition that engagement 
with ICs can persist into adulthood. Taylor et  al. (2004) found 
continued engagement with ICs (in a sample that had originally 
been studied in the preschool years) at age 7 and on into 
adolescence. Although anecdotal evidence suggests that some 
adults engage with ICs (Taylor, 1999), to date, there has been 
no systematic study of the persistence of ICs into adulthood. 
Beyond the question of the continued engagement with ICs 
in adulthood, another avenue of research involves examining 
what – if any – cognitive differences in adulthood may be 
observed in those with a history of ICs. For example, Firth 
et  al. (2015) found that adults reporting having had an IC in 
childhood scored more highly on a scene construction task, 
employed as an objective measure of imaginative capacity, as 
well as rating themselves as more imaginative.
We set out to explore several hypotheses concerning the 
relations between ICs and hallucinatory experiences. In the 
first study, we  asked a large sample of online respondents 
about their experience of ICs in childhood and adulthood. In 
line with the reasoning of Pearson et al. (2001) and Fernyhough 
et al. (2007), we predicted that individuals reporting engagement 
with ICs would show greater susceptibility to hallucination-like 
experiences in adulthood. We  additionally took measures of 
the sensory vividness of reported IC interactions and 
IC autonomy.
We also examined ideas from Fernyhough et  al. (2007) and 
Davis et  al. (2013) on the relation between ICs and the 
development of inner speech. Using a new questionnaire 
assessment of the quality of inner speech in adulthood, 
we  investigated relations among IC status, varieties of inner 
speech, and hallucination proneness in our large sample of 
online respondents. Specifically, we  predicted that those with 
experience of ICs would evidence more expanded, social-like 
experiences of inner speech, such as reporting other people 
in inner speech, or inner speech with dialogic characteristics. 
We  also gathered, in the largest sample examined to date, 
novel data on the persistence of ICs into adulthood.
In the second study, we  worked with a smaller, separate 
sample of participants to explore the cognitive processes involved 
in distinguishing real events from imagined ones. We  assessed 
this capacity with an auditory signal detection paradigm. Biased 
performance on such tasks has been linked to reality-monitoring 
processes and strongly implicated in the experience of AVH 
(Bentall, 1990; Brookwell et al., 2013), but has never previously 
been examined in relation to IC engagement. We also assessed 
social cognition (theory of mind) to test specificity of any 
cognitive effects.
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STUDY 1: METHOD
Participants
A sample of 1,472 participants (age M  =  38.84; SD  =  13.42; 
1,112 females) were recruited via an online survey originally 
designed to explore inner speech and reading imagery 
(Alderson-Day et  al., 2017). The survey was advertised via a 
UK national newspaper (The Guardian) and the Edinburgh 
International Book Festival. The majority of participants were 
based in the UK (n  =  748) or USA (n  =  213) and education 
levels were high, with over 80% of the sample possessing a 
graduate degree or above (for a full description of the sample, 
see Alderson-Day et  al., 2018).
Measures
Imaginary Companions Questionnaire
Due to the lack of measures for assessing ICs in adulthood, 
a bespoke schedule of questions was devised to assess IC status 
(past and current), plus characteristics of IC experiences 
(see Table 1).
The following questions were used:
 1. Did you  ever have any imaginary friends when you  were 
growing up?
 2. Do you  have any imaginary friends now?
 3. If you  have had an imaginary friend, did you  ever hear 
their voice?
 4. If you  have had an imaginary friend or friends, did you  ever 
see them or have other sensory experiences in relation to them?
 5. If you  ever had an imaginary friend or friends, did they 
sometimes act of their own accord (as opposed to always 
doing what you  told them to do)?
Questions 1, 2 and 5 were answered with a yes/no response. 
Questions 3 and 4 were completed with the following response 
options: Never, Very occasionally, Some of the time, Most of 
the time, All of the time.
Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale – Revised, 
Auditory Subscale
A 5-item version of the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale 
(henceforth LSHS-A) was chosen to examine proneness to 
auditory hallucination-like experiences (“hearing voices”) in the 
sample (Bentall and Slade, 1985; Morrison et al., 2000). Participants 
answer items describing a range of perceptual errors (such as 
hearing one’s name being called momentarily) and rate their 
frequency from 1 (Never) to 4 (Almost Always). Despite being 
a short measure, the 5-item LSHS-A has moderate/good internal 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha  =  0.69; McCarthy-Jones and 
Fernyhough, 2011). Online assessment of psychopathological 
variables has been shown to be  reliable compared to traditional 
pen-and-paper methods (Jones et  al., 2008).
Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire – Revised
The Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire – Revised (VISQ-R) 
is a 26-item scale that requires participants to report on the 
frequency of various phenomenological characteristics of inner 
speech (Alderson-Day et  al., 2018). It has five factors: dialogic 
inner speech, evaluative/critical inner speech, condensed inner 
speech, other people in inner speech, and positive/regulatory 
inner speech. The scale has strong internal reliability (alphas > 0.8) 
and is consistently related to various psychopathological traits, 
such as hallucination proneness, dissociation, anxiety, and 
depression (Alderson-Day et  al., 2018).
Analysis
All data were analyzed in R, unless otherwise stated. Differences 
in hallucination proneness and inner speech characteristics 
were compared between four groups based on their IC status: 
those with no history of having an IC, those with a childhood 
IC only, those with a childhood and current IC, and those 
with a current IC only. For inferential statistics, skewed 
distributions were corrected using either log transformations 
(LSHS, Condensed VISQ, Other People VISQ) or square root 
TABLE 1 | Imaginary companion incidence and characteristics.
  n (%)
1. Did you ever have any imaginary friends when you were growing up? Yes No NA/missing
608 (41%) 859 (58%) 5 (<1%)
2. Do you have any imaginary friends now? Yes No NA/missing
110 (7%) 1,358 (92%) 4 (<1%)
3. If you have had an imaginary friend, did you ever hear their voice?
Never Very occasionally Some of the time Most of the time All of the time NA/missing
198 (31%) 97(15%) 140 (22%) 94 (15%) 57 (9%) 46 (7%)
4. If you have had an imaginary friend or friends, did you ever see them  
or have other sensory experiences in relation to them?
Never Very occasionally Some of the time Most of the time All of the time NA/missing
249 (39%) 131 (21%) 120 (19%) 67 (11%) 29 (5%) 36 (6%)
5. If you ever had an imaginary friend or friends, did they sometimes act of their 
own accord (as opposed to always doing what you told them to do)? Yes No NA/missing
242 (38%) 307 (49%) 83 (13%)
Percentages for items 3–5 were calculated from the total of all participants who had an imaginary companion at some point (n = 632).
Fernyhough et al. Imaginary Companions
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transformations of reflected scores (Dialogic VISQ, Evaluative 
VISQ). For ease of interpretation, all figures and tables report 
untransformed scores. No transformed outcomes failed Levene’s 
test (all p  >  0.05).
STUDY 1: RESULTS
Characteristics of Imaginary Companions
Table 1 displays the main IC characteristics reported across 
the sample. The majority – 56% – of participants had never 
had any experience of an IC, but as many as 41% had an 
IC in childhood. A total of 69% of participants with an IC 
(at any point in their life) reported having had an experience 
of hearing the IC’s voice on at least one occasion, while 61% 
had had visual or other sensory experiences. From those 
who responded to both questions 1 and 2 of the survey 
(N  =  1,463), the four groups separated out as follows: those 
with no history of an IC (n  =  831), those with a childhood 
IC only (n  =  522), those with a childhood and current IC 
(n  =  84), and those with a current IC only (n  =  26). Table  2 
displays mean ages and scores for hallucination proneness 
(LSHS-R) and inner speech characteristics (the VISQ-R) across 
the four groups.
Relations With Hallucination Proneness 
and Inner Speech
As can be  seen in Figure 1, scores for LSHS-A were positively 
skewed, with a majority of participants across all groups reporting 
very little experience of hallucinations. Nevertheless, a one-way 
ANOVA on log-transformed scores for the LSHS-A indicated 
a significant main effect of group, F(3, 1,459) = 10.74, p < 0.001, 
hp2   =  0.022. Post hoc Games-Howell tests (which correct for 
multiple comparisons) indicated that those with a childhood 
and current IC scored higher for hallucination proneness than 
all three other groups (all p  <  0.044), while those with a past 
IC were also more hallucination prone than participants with 
no IC at all (p  =  0.002).
With an alpha correction to 0.01 (to account for multiple 
testing across the five VISQ-R subscales), similar results were 
observed for dialogic inner speech, F(3, 1,459) = 9.15, p < 0.001, 
hp2  = 0.018; evaluative/critical inner speech, F(3, 1,459) = 5.58, 
p  =  0.001, hp2   =  0.011; and other people in inner speech 
F(3, 1,459)  =  15.84, p  <  0.001, hp2   =  0.032. Differences in 
positive inner speech were marginal but non-significant, 
F(3, 1,459)  =  3.43, p  =  0.016, hp2   =  0.007, while no group 
differences were observed for condensed inner speech, 
F(3, 1,459)  =  1.96, p  =  0.117, hp2   =  0.004.
Broadly similar pairwise differences were observed in post 
hoc analysis, again using Games-Howell tests. For dialogic inner 
speech, those with a past and current IC scored higher than 
those without an IC (p < 0.001) and those with only a childhood 
IC (p = 0.019), but not those with a current IC only (p = 0.051), 
while more dialogic inner speech was also observed in those 
with a childhood IC compared to those with no IC history 
(p = 0.005). The same pattern of group comparisons was evident 
for the Other People inner speech factor (all p  <  0.01). For 
evaluative/critical inner speech, scores only significantly differed 
between those with both current and childhood ICs compared 
to the childhood IC group (p  =  0.019) and those with no IC 
(p  <  0.001).
STUDY 1: DISCUSSION
Study 1 set out to explore for the first time relations between 
IC status in childhood and adulthood, the quality of inner 
speech, and proneness to AVH. Data gathered from a large 
sample of online respondents supported predictions that 
experience of ICs would be associated with a greater susceptibility 
to AVH. The highest scores for AVH proneness were observed 
in those who had both had an IC in childhood and continued 
to have one in adulthood. Comparable findings were observed 
in relation to measures of social-like experiences of inner 
speech, particularly on the Dialogic, Other People, and Evaluative/
Critical factors.
A further aim of Study 1 was to gather novel data on 
the persistence of ICs into adulthood, using the largest 
sample employed to date in such analyses. The proportion of 
individuals reporting experience of ICs in childhood (41%) 
was roughly in line with previous studies. A total of 110 
participants (representing around 7.5% of the sample) reported 
experience of ICs in adulthood. Of those reporting a childhood 
TABLE 2 | Hallucination proneness and inner speech features by imaginary companion status.
  M (SD)
No IC Childhood IC only Childhood and current IC Current IC only
Age 38.77 (13.07) 39.08 (13.83) 37.49 (13.84) 40.15 (14.2)
LSHS-A 8.76 (2.77) 9.29 (2.87) 10.56 (3.6) 8.58 (2.79)
VISQ-R Dialogic 23.69 (6.88) 24.94 (6.69) 27.11 (5.84) 23.24 (6.73)
Evaluative 33.15 (8.34) 34.02 (8.51) 36.91 (7.06) 33.42 (10.40)
Other people 13.93 (7.34) 15.92 (7.67) 19.30 (8.05) 15.91 (8.10)
Condensed 14.33 (6.61) 14.24 (6.21) 13.98 (6.64) 17.62 (7.00)
Positive 18.07 (4.88) 18.61 (4.65) 19.62 (5.34) 18.76 (5.00)
IC, Imaginary companion; LSHS-A, Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale – Auditory; VISQ-R, Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire – Revised.
Fernyhough et al. Imaginary Companions
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IC, 13.8% reported continued IC engagement in adulthood. 
Our findings are also consistent with previous observations 
that the behavior of ICs is not always fully under the experiencer’s 
control (Taylor et  al., 2007).
Several limitations of Study 1 need to be mentioned. Although 
the group differences reached high levels of significance, they 
represent what would conventionally be  described as small 
effects (hp2  between 0.011 and 0.032). Further limitations were 
the embedding of our data collection within a wider study 
of reading imagery (Alderson-Day et al., 2017), and the exclusive 
reliance on online self-report as a method of data gathering. 
The consequence of the former is that this sample may 
be  skewed toward those high in imagery vividness and 
imaginative tendencies in the general population, while the 
latter limitation might have served to increase correlations 
among variables within the sample (i.e., common-method 
variance). Accordingly, in our second study, we used cognitive 
tasks that have previously been associated with the presence 
of hallucinations to obtain arguably more objective measures 
of relevant processes. The fact that we  were working with a 
smaller sample also allowed us to obtain parental corroboration 
of childhood IC status, which is considered best practice in 
IC research (Taylor and Carlson, 1997).
STUDY 2: METHOD
Employing a smaller sample of participants in a lab-based 
study, we  replicated the measures used in Study 1 and added 
two tasks to assess cognitive processes previously implicated 
in IC status and AVH proneness. One such task is auditory 
signal detection, a measure which requires participants to 
detect speech clips embedded in noise. Previous findings have 
indicated that AVH proneness is associated with a tendency 
to falsely detect speech in noise, with signal detection parameters 
indicating that this is due to a response bias, rather than 
reduced task sensitivity. This has been linked to reality 
monitoring processes (i.e., the processes used to distinguish 
between self- and non-self-generated stimuli; Brookwell et al., 
2013), or the influence of top-down processes on perception 
(Moseley et al., 2016), and has never previously been examined 
in relation to IC engagement. The second process, social 
cognition or theory of mind, has been associated with IC 
status in childhood, but has not been consistently associated 
with hallucination proneness in adult population samples (e.g., 
Fernyhough et  al., 2008). To further examine the role of 
theory of mind, we  therefore included a commonly used 
measure of “mentalizing” abilities: the Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen et  al., 2001).
Participants
A sample of 14 adults with a history of imaginary companions 
(age M  =  21.21, SD  =  2.26, 4 males) and 34 adults with no 
imaginary companions (age M  =  21.18, SD  =  2.18, 13 males) 
were recruited via a university participant pool, email circular, 
social media, and a recruitment blog article (Watson, 2017). 
Participants received either course credit or a gift voucher 
for their participation. On recruitment into the study, participants 
were asked to complete a short schedule about their history 
of imaginary companions (see Table 3), and to ask their 
parents to complete three questions: whether their child (1) 
had an IC when they were younger, (2) spoke to the IC, or 
(3) actively played with the IC. No participants who reported 
an IC failed the parental verification check; however, two 
participants did not recall having an IC when their parents 
reported that they had (including outwardly interacting with 
the IC). The latter two participants were included in the IC 
group, but were marked in later analysis in case they unduly 
influenced the group results.
Measures
Imaginary Companions Questionnaire
Table 3 shows the questions asked of participants about their 
IC history. The questions used were broadly similar to those 
used in Study 1, although specific questions about observable 
behaviors (e.g., playing with the IC) were also included to 
FIGURE 1 | Hallucination proneness by imaginary companion group.
TABLE 3 | Participant IC schedule and response frequencies in IC  
group (n = 14).
Participant questions Yes (%)
 1. Did you have an imaginary friend during childhood? 85.7*
 2. Did you speak to this imaginary friend? 85.7
 3. Did you actively play with this imaginary friend? 78.6
 4. Do you have any imaginary friends now? 0
 5. If you ever had an imaginary friend, did they 
sometimes act of their own accord (as opposed to 
always doing what you told them to do)?
21.4
*Two participants were included because their parents reported them having an IC in 
childhood, even though they did not recall having one.
Fernyhough et al. Imaginary Companions
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allow for comparison with parent reports. Each question was 
answered with a binary response (Yes or No).
Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale – Revised
For Study 2, a 9-item version of the LSHS was used which 
incorporated the five auditory LSHS items used in Study 1, 
and added four items from the full LSHS relating to visual 
experiences (for example, I see shadows and shapes when there 
is nothing there) (Bentall and Slade, 1985; Morrison et al., 2000). 
The longer scale provides a more reliable estimate of hallucination 
proneness, and is in line with use of the LSHS in the wider 
hallucinations literature (which often focuses on general 
hallucination proneness; e.g., Siddi et  al., 2019).
Signal Detection Task
An auditory signal detection task (SDT) was used modeled 
on those used by Smailes et  al. (2014) and Moseley et  al. 
(2014). Participants were asked to listen to 60 trials containing 
5-s bursts of white noise, played over headphones. In 12 trials, 
speech was clearly present in the white noise at an audible 
volume; in 24 trials, no speech was present; and in 24 trials, 
speech was played at a threshold volume calibrated in piloting 
to allow a 50% success rate (pilot sample n  =  10). The speech 
was identical to that employed in previous studies and first 
used by Barkus et  al. (2007): a 1.5-s clip of a male voice 
reading aloud from an instruction manual. On each trial, 
participants were asked to indicate whether speech was present 
or absent, providing four response outcomes: hits (correctly 
identifying speech when present), misses (failing to identify 
speech when present), correct rejections (identifying when speech 
is absent), and false alarms (hearing speech when none is 
being played). Following Stanislaw and Todorov (1999), these 
outcomes were used to calculate beta (β), a measure of response 
bias, and d-prime (d′), a measure of sensitivity or discrimination. 
Scores below 1 for beta indicate a bias toward classifying trials 
as containing speech, while scores above 1 indicate a bias 
away from identifying speech. Higher scores on discrimination 
indicate better sensitivity on the task. Following previous studies 
of hallucination proneness and signal detection, the primary 
outcome on the task was beta (see Brookwell et  al., 2013, for 
a review), while d′ – on which people with hallucinations 
usually do not differ from control participants – was used as 
a control outcome.
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task
This social cognition (theory of mind) task was used as a 
control task to determine specificity of any effects relating to 
signal detection (Baron-Cohen et  al., 2001). The revised adult 
version (Baron-Cohen et  al., 2001) was used to accommodate 
the age of the sample and was presented in printed form. 
Both validity and test-retest reliability have been found to 
be  high enough to treat scores as a good approximation of 
theory of mind ability (including cross-culturally). Participants 
were asked to select one of four words that they believed best 
described the emotional or mental state of 30 different sets 
of eyes. The selection of words varied for each question. 
Definitions were available for each participant, including an 
example sentence. All participants reported being proficient 
in English.
Procedure
All testing took place in a quiet room away from auditory 
distractors. Following consent, participants completed the LSHS 
and a paper version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
test, and then the signal detection task. Participants wore 
over-ear Sennheiser HD206 headphones with the volume set 
to 20%. The SDT was run using E-Prime 2.0 on a 17″ 
Lenovo laptop.
Analysis
All analyses were conducted in R. Group differences for 
hallucination proneness, signal detection bias (β), and social 
cognition performance were compared using Welch’s t-tests. 
d′ (or sensitivity) on the SDT was also analyzed as a control 
variable. Prior to analysis, log-transforms were applied to LSHS 
scores and β scores on the SDT, while a square root transformation 
was applied to d′ scores; this reduced skew in the data and 
served to normalize distributions within each IC group. However, 
for ease of interpretation, raw scores are included in the 
reporting of descriptive statistics.
STUDY 2: RESULTS
Table 4 shows the mean scores for each IC group on the 
LSHS, signal detection task, and Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes task. To correct for multiple comparisons across the main 
outcomes for the questionnaire and two tasks, the alpha level 
was adjusted to 0.016 (0.05/3). When the groups were compared, 
significant differences were evident for LSHS, t (18.79) = 2.73, 
p = 0.013, d = 0.99, indicating higher hallucination proneness 
in the IC group.
On the signal detection task, both groups were more likely 
to say speech was absent than present (as indicated by mean 
scores over 1), but IC participants showed significantly lower 
β scores than controls (i.e., they exhibited more bias toward 
responding that there was speech present), t (26.92)  =  3.00, 
p  =  0.005, d  =  0.96. However, group differences were also 
evident on the control variable, d′, indicating lower sensitivity 
in the IC group, t (17.57)  =  2.37, p  =  0.030, d  =  0.87. No 
group differences were observed for scores on the Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes task, t (22.23)  =  0.12, p  =  0.909, 
d  =  0.04, n.s1.
1 These analyses were also checked for (1) LSHS auditory items only (in line 
with Study 1) and (2) group differences following the omission of the two 
participants who did not recall ICs despite their parents indicting otherwise. 
As for LSHS total scores, IC participants scored significantly higher for auditory 
LSHS, t (23.72)  =  3.78, p  <  0.001. With the omission of the two participants, 
group differences were still evident for LSHS, t (15.06)  =  2.14, p  =  0.0488, 
and signal detection bias, t (20.09)  =  2.58, p  =  0.018, but no longer for 
sensitivity, t (14.12)  =  1.87, p  =  0.083, n.s.
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Finally, although a Fisher’s exact test suggested that the 
distribution of gender across the two groups did not deviate 
from parity (p  =  0.741), we  compared LSHS, beta, and d′ 
scores by gender to gauge their potential influence on IC group 
differences. No gender differences were observed, with the 
closest to significance being beta scores, t (38.04)  =  1.71, 
p  =  0.09. As this was in the direction of males showing more 
bias toward reporting speech to be  present (M  =  1.83) than 
females (M  =  2.74), with a majority of males being in the 
non-IC group, this seemed unlikely to have affected the difference 
observed between IC groups in response bias.
STUDY 2: DISCUSSION
Study 2 presented us with the opportunity to investigate 
associations between IC status and hallucination proneness 
in the context of measures of relevant cognitive processes. 
We replicated Study 1’s finding of higher hallucination proneness 
in the group of adults with childhood ICs. Our findings also 
aligned with previous results showing a relation between 
hallucination proneness and bias (β) on an auditory signal 
detection task, with participants in the IC group showing a 
greater bias toward responding that speech was present. 
We  did not replicate the previously observed finding of no 
differences in sensitivity between groups high and low in 
hallucination proneness; in our sample, participants in the 
IC group showed reduced sensitivity. This is in line with a 
few studies that have reported patients with AVH showing 
reduced sensitivity as well as bias (e.g., Vercammen et  al., 
2008). The two IC status groups did not differ on social 
cognition (theory of mind) performance, suggesting that the 
group effects on cognitive task performance were specific to 
the signal detection task.
One limitation of Study 2 was the small sample. However, 
our methodology did require recruiting people with ICs into 
a lab-based study, as well as requiring parental verification, 
which made recruitment more challenging. Our findings form 
part of a small but growing body of research into the neglected 
area of cognitive processes in adults with a history of ICs (e.g., 
Firth et  al., 2015). In addition, despite our relatively small 
sample, our findings are in line with previous work on the 
cognitive processes implicated in hallucinations, with, for example, 
very similar false alarm rates in the no-IC group compared to 
those observed in previous studies (Moseley et  al., 2014, 2016).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The two studies reported here were motivated to explore several 
hypotheses concerning the relations between ICs and 
hallucinatory experiences. In Study 1, a large sample of online 
respondents were asked about their experience of ICs in 
childhood and adulthood. In line with predictions, experience 
of ICs was associated with a greater susceptibility to AVH, 
with the highest scores for AVH proneness observed in individuals 
who had both had an IC in childhood and continued to have 
one in adulthood. The inner speech reported by individuals 
with ICs was more likely to include social-like qualities such 
as dialogicality, other people, and evaluation/criticism. Study 1 
also presents the largest dataset yet gathered on the persistence 
of ICs into adulthood, with around 7.5% of the sample reporting 
experience of ICs in adulthood.
Study 2 represents the first attempt to link IC engagement 
with cognitive processes relevant to hallucination proneness, 
specifically auditory signal detection and social cognition (theory 
of mind). Individuals reporting ICs showed a greater bias 
toward reporting the presence of speech in noise, along with 
reduced sensitivity. The groups did not differ on theory of 
mind performance, suggesting that the cognitive tasks effects 
were specific to auditory signal detection.
Taken together, the two studies reported here are in line 
with the view that engaging with an IC bears some similarities 
with psychotic experiences, specifically hallucinations. As noted 
in section “Introduction,” a small body of research has attempted 
to explore these relations, including Pearson et  al.’s (2001) 
suggestion that engaging with ICs involves non-veridical percept-
like experiences, and Fernyhough et  al.’ (2007) proposal that 
engaging with ICs is a by-product of a developmental process 
involving the gradual internalization of dialogic social exchanges. 
The present findings are not sufficient either to confirm or 
disconfirm these theoretical proposals, but they are at least 
consistent with them. For the first time, the research presented 
here has been able to relate these experiences to the quality 
of inner speech, which has been linked both to childhood 
engagement with ICs (Davis et  al., 2013) and to AVH (see, 
e.g., Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015).
The studies reported here also speak to the question of 
whether, and how, childhood ICs persist into adulthood. The 
research described here was cross-sectional rather than 
longitudinal, and thus cannot address whether the ICs engaged 
with in childhood were, for those with persistent ICs, identical 
to those experienced in adulthood. It does, however, suggest 
that adults who had childhood ICs show cognitive differences 
from those without such experiences. In other words, the 
association observed in childhood between IC status and 
hallucination proneness appears to persist into adulthood.
That is not to say that ICs that emerge in adulthood 
are underpinned by the same processes that give rise to 
TABLE 4 | Hallucination-proneness and task performance by IC group.
  M (SD)
IC (n = 14) No-IC (n = 24)
LSHS 18.21 (5.94) 13.85 (3.18)
SDT
 - Hits (%) 66.66 (11.47) 53.75 (15.46)
 - False Alarms (%) 35.42 (19.25) 14.08 (11.21)
 - Beta 1.55 (1.82) 2.77 (2.32)
 - d′ 0.86 (0.60) 1.23 (0.41)
RMET 28.21 (3.51) 28.09 (3.18)
IC, Imaginary companion; LSHS, Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale; SDT, Signal 
Detection Task; RMET, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test. Hit percentages are 
calculated from a total of 36 trials; false alarms from a total of 24 trials.
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ICs in childhood. Establishing continuity in IC experience 
between childhood and adulthood would require long-term 
longitudinal data, and one should resist the assumption that 
adult ICs necessarily represent childhood ICs that have not 
gone away. There may indeed be  such continuity, but ICs may 
also be  constructed anew in adulthood, raising the possibility 
that such ICs are underpinned by separate cognitive mechanisms 
to those in operation in childhood. This is particularly pertinent 
for individuals who only develop ICs in adulthood: for both 
hallucination proneness and inner speech, this group were most 
similar to those who had never experienced an IC at all. It 
is likely that there are multiple cognitive routes toward 
hallucination-like experiences in the nonclinical population 
(Waters and Fernyhough, 2019), especially for those who 
deliberately cultivate such experiences (Luhrmann et al., 2019). 
Tulpamancers (Mikles and Laycock, 2015; Veissière, 2015) and 
spiritualists (Powers et al., 2017), for example, describe non-self, 
agentic experiences that in some ways parallel ICs, but which 
often rely on long periods of focused practice (such as meditation). 
It is possible that such practices could “unlock” ICs for adults 
who did not otherwise have a childhood proneness or tendency 
to have IC experiences.
The experience of shaping and engaging with ICs has also 
been linked to the creative imaginative act of molding fictional 
characters into existence, where literary writers displace agency 
into externalized imaginary beings (Taylor et al., 2003; Bernini, 
2014). The creation of fictional characters and the generation 
of imaginary friends arguably share a feeling of distributed 
agency paired with knowledge of the subjective source of these 
creative acts. Looking into how readers represent fictional minds 
can also offer insight into the links between ICs and AVH. 
There is growing evidence that readers experience fictional 
voices as highly vivid, personified, and agentive (Alderson-Day 
et  al., 2017; Maslej et  al., 2017). Sometimes the personified 
voices and worldviews of fictional characters even cross into 
the reader’s experience of the everyday, in what some authors 
have termed “experiential crossing” (Alderson-Day et al., 2017). 
This type of crossing between imagination and reality resembles 
hallucinatory dynamics in terms of the spontaneous emergence 
of social agents within the mind, thus reinforcing possible 
links between AVH, the creation and reception of fictional 
characters, and the experience of ICs.
Data from the cognitive task measures included in Study 2 
suggested that there is at least some overlap between the 
cognitive processes associated with hallucinations and those 
associated with childhood ICs, supporting the conclusions from 
self-report measures used in Study 1. Specifically, participants 
in the IC group were more likely to report the presence of 
speech in noise than those in the non-IC group in the signal 
detection task. While Study 1 evidenced elevated levels of inner 
speech with social qualities (dialogic or evaluative inner speech, 
or use of inner speech involving other people) in those with 
ICs, Study 2 suggested that performance on the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Test, an index of social-cognitive processes 
involved in theory of mind, was not linked to the presence 
of ICs, suggesting no impairment in mentalizing in individuals 
with past ICs.
Performance on the signal detection task has previously 
been linked to an externalizing bias in reality monitoring (i.e., 
a bias toward misattributing imagined events as real; Brookwell 
et  al., 2013), or over-weighted top-down processes influencing 
perception (Moseley et  al., 2016), suggesting that ICs may 
be linked to these cognitive processes. However, it is noteworthy 
that participants in the IC group also showed a lower sensitivity 
(d′) on the signal detection task, indicating that they also 
were less able to distinguish the speech from the noise. This 
pattern is divergent from previous studies showing that 
hallucinating psychosis patients showed a difference in response 
bias but not sensitivity (e.g., Bentall and Slade, 1985; Varese 
et  al., 2012), though some previous studies have reported 
reductions in both measures (e.g., Vercammen et  al., 2008). 
While a bias toward speech detection may be  consistent with 
reality-monitoring or top-down accounts of hallucinations, a 
reduction in sensitivity may also indicate more basic perceptual 
disturbances. Further research is needed to untangle specific 
patterns of performance and their association with ICs and 
proneness to hallucinations. Overall, cognitive data from Study 2 
support the continuity across age in IC engagement suggested 
by the questionnaire data in Study 1 – and indicate more of 
a link with basic perceptual disturbance than social cognition 
or theory of mind – but at the same time are slightly different 
from a patient profile (in highlighting differences in sensitivity).
Although the signal detection task is widely used in the 
hallucination literature, it is possible that alternative tasks might 
shed further light on the cognitive processes involved (Brookwell 
et  al., 2013). For example, a limitation of signal detection 
tasks in understanding AVH is that they do not typically 
manipulate the amount of auditory verbal imagery used by 
participants in performing the task. Future research in this 
area might utilize paradigms which can manipulate engagement 
in such imagery (Moseley et al., 2016). Other reality-monitoring 
tasks, particularly those drawn from the episodic memory 
literature, might reveal different associations with the variables 
of interest (e.g., Garrison et  al., 2017). Future research might 
also consider the role of autistic traits in the observed relations 
among ICs, AVH, and inner speech. Such traits are known 
to affect weighting of sensory information (Karvelis et  al., 
2018), although their relation to ICs is only beginning to 
be  explored (Davis et  al., 2018). Although there are practical 
difficulties with long-range longitudinal research, investigating 
the development of these traits and abilities over the life course 
would be  highly desirable.
As summarized above, limitations of the present study include 
the relatively small effect sizes in Study 1, the embedding of 
our data collection in a wider study of reading imagery and 
the use of online self-report (Study 1), and the relatively small 
size of the sample in Study 2. A further potential limitation 
of both studies is that recall of childhood experiences might 
be unreliable (the reason why we sought parental corroboration 
in Study 2). In addition, it is possible that the presence of 
AVH is associated with autobiographical memory biases that 
might increase the likelihood of childhood ICs being recalled.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the present findings provide 
some support for the view that ICs develop in childhood as 
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a by-product of typical developmental processes. A challenge 
for future research is to find out more about those ICs that 
either persist into, or are generated anew, in adulthood, along 
with the cognitive and neural mechanisms that make continued 
engagement with ICs possible.
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